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Davidson County v. 'City of High Point: The North Carolina
Supreme Court Solves A City-County Conflict
As the municipal population increases and as county areas become more
urbanized, North Carolina cities face growing pressures to expand their jurisdic-
tions by annexing land of surrounding counties.1 With the increase in a munici-
pality's jurisdiction comes the obligation to extend municipal services to newly
annexed areas. Orderly urban growth requires clear demarcation of city and
county powers so that no area is subjected to inconsistent regulations. The
North Carolina General Assembly has created an effective statutory framework
that minimizes the jurisdictional conflict between cities and counties involved in
the annexation process. However, a potential jurisdictional conflict between cit-
ies and counties remains.
In Davidson County v. City of High Point2 the North Carolina Supreme
Court dealt with the "jurisdictional conflict between the statutory power cities
possess to provide services through public enterprises and the statutory power
counties possess to regulate the use of land within their boundaries through zon-
ing ordinances. ' 3 Specifically, the issue in Davidson County was
whether a city-owned sewage treatment plant located outside the city
but within the county, which is upgraded pursuant to the county's spe-
cial use permit, may be used by the city to provide sewer service to its
citizens in newly annexed areas without complying with a condition
attached to the permit requiring the county's prior approval of service
to county citizens. 4
Based on the statutory powers conferred on cities and counties, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that the city of High Point did not have to comply with
the condition attached to the county's special use permit requiring prior county
approval for sewer extension. 5
This Note summarizes the facts and decision in Davidson County and ex-
plains the significance of the supreme court's clarification of the division of pow-
ers between municipalities and counties. It discusses the rationale used by the
supreme court and how it modified the holding of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals. Finally, it concludes that the narrower holding of the supreme court is
correct and points out a broader issue raised by the lower court but left un-
resolved by the supreme court.
1. The dominant units of local government in North Carolina are divided into two basic cate-
gories: cities (public or municipal corporations) and counties (public quasi-corporations). "[B]oth
local governments have broad regulatory powers with respect to many specific matters, and both
have general police powers. In short, both cities and counties are general-purpose units of local self-
government." Wicker, Relationships Between Counties and Municipalities, in STATE-LOCAL RELA-
TIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA 30, 32 (C. Linen ed. 1985); see also 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT LAW § 6 (1982) (discussing units of local government in the United States).
2. 321 N.C. 252, 362 S.E.2d 553 (1987).
3. Id. at 253, 362 S.E.2d at 554.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 260, 362 S.E.2d at 558.
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The city of High Point owns the Westside High Point Wastewater Treat-
ment Facility, which services the city and surrounding area. The fifty-year-old
sewage plant is located outside the city limits, but within Davidson County.6 In
May 1983, pursuant to a Davidson County zoning ordinance, the city applied
for a special use permit to upgrade and expand the plant.7 o In October 1983 the
county issued the permit with various conditions attached, including the
following:
4. SEWAGE TREATMENT CAPACITY FOR DAVIDSON
COUNTY CITIZENS:
The necessary documents shall be executed to clearly identify pro-
jected volume of sewage treatment capacity which can be assessed by
the citizens of Davidson County. The provision of sewer service to the
citizens of Davidson County shall be subject to final approval of the Da-
vidson County Board of Commissioners.8
The validity of this condition was at issue in Davidson County.
In September 1984 the owner of a sixty-acre parcel located in Davidson
County made a request to the city of High Point for voluntary annexation. 9
Because the county could not provide sewer service to the tract and the parcel
was not suitable for septic tanks, the owner requested that the city provide sewer
service through an outfall from the Westside plant which already ran through
the property. 10 The city gave notice of a public hearing to consider the annexa-
tion and did not plan to seek prior approval from the county regarding sewer
service. 11
Acting under the apparent authority of the fourth condition attached to the
special use permit, 12 Davidson County notified the city of High Point that the
city would be in violation of the special use permit if it failed to seek prior
county approval. 13 The county stated that city annexation with subsequent
sewer extension to the sixty-acre parcel should await the completion of the ex-
pansion and upgrading of the Westside Facility. 14
In a letter to High Point city officials, the Davidson County Board of Com-
missioners expressed its concern about the economic and environmental impact
of the annexation and sewer extension. The county cited the severe impact on
its county budget that would result from "increased population density; school
attendance; school population; school bus transportation; school capital outlay;
6. Id. at 253, 362 S.E.2d at 554-55.
7. Id. For a discussion of special use permits, see infra note 59 and accompanying text.
8. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 253, 362 S.E.2d at 555.
9. Id. at 254, 362 S.E.2d at 555. For a discussion of annexations, see infra notes 37-39 and
accompanying text.
10. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 254, 362 S.E.2d at 555.
11. Id. Prior to the requested sixty-acre annexation, the city annexed an eight-acre tract in the
county and provided sewer service from the Westside Facility without obtaining the county's ap-
proval. Id.
12. See supra text accompanying note 8.
13. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 255, 362 S.E.2d at 555 (referring to a September 20, 1984,
letter from the County Board of Commissioners to the city).
14. Id at 254-55, 362 S.E.2d at 555.
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provision of public water; fire protection and emergency ambulance service." 15
Additionally, the county was worried about the "negative impact to the streams
and properties of Davidson County" from the increased wastewater flow before
the expansion and upgrading of the Westside Facility was completed.
1 6
In February 1985, ignoring the county's demand, the city exercised a non-
contiguous annexation of the sixty-acre parcel with plans to extend sewer service
from the Westside plant.17 The county sought to enjoin the city "from annexing
any areas located in the County for which the Westside Facility would be used
to provide sewer service, and from using the Westside Facility to provide sewer
service to residents of Davidson County in the annexed areas without prior ap-
proval from the County .... ,"18 If upheld, the effect of this decision would have
been to allow the county to control any city annexation that required sewer
service from the Westside Facility.
At trial the county argued that the city violated the condition attached to
the special use permit requiring county approval for any sewer extension from
the Westside plant.19 The city claimed the condition, as interpreted by the
county, was beyond the scope of the county's zoning authority and that the
condition was invalid because it did not promote the health, safety, morals, or
general welfare of the citizens of Davidson County.20 The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the county and enjoined the city from using the
Westside facility to provide sewer services to county citizens, whether inside or
outside the city limits, without first obtaining approval from the county.2 1
The North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously overruled the trial
court, basing its decision on a theory not briefed by either party.22 The court
addressed the broad issue of whether a city's public enterprise, in this case a
sewage plant, located outside city limits but within the county, is subject to the
county's zoning regulations. Distinguishing between a "building" and a "public
enterprise" as used in the statutes, the court of appeals held that a city-owned
public enterprise located outside city limits is not subject to a county's zoning
laws.23
15. Id. at 254, 362 S.E.2d at 555.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 255, 362 S.E.2d at 555. Annexation is discussed infra notes 37-39 and accompanying
text.
18. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 255, 362 S.E.2d at 556.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 255-56, 362 S.E.2d at 556.
22. Davidson County v. City of High Point, 85 N.C. App. 26, 26-27, 354 S.E.2d 280, 281,
modified and aff'd, 321 N.C. 252, 362 S.E.2d 553 (1987); see Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 256, 362
S.E.2d at 556.
23. Davidson County, 85 N.C. App. at 26-27, 354 S.E.2d at 281. As summarized by the
supreme court, the court of appeals found
that the Westside Facility was not a building within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 153A-347
(which provides that a county's zoning regulations are applicable to the erection, construc-
tion, and use of buildings [owned by the State of North Carolina and its political subdivi-
sions]) but was rather a public enterprise within the meaning of N.C.G.S. §§ 153A-274 and
160A-311 .... The Court of Appeals found that N.C.G.S. § 153A-340 [granting county
zoning powers]-did not specifically give a county the authority to regulate another jurisdic-
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The North Carolina Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the result of
the court of appeals, but reached its conclusion on different and narrower
grounds. The supreme court did not address whether a city's public enterprise
located in a county is subject to that county's zoning regulations. Instead, the
court decided what it termed "[tihe issue actually presented," whether the con-
dition attached to the county's special use permit exceeded the scope of the
county's zoning authority in granting the special use permit.24 The validity of
the special use permit proper was not an issue presented in this case. The
supreme court only invalidated the condition attached to the special use permit,
holding that to give a county the power to disapprove sewer service to city resi-
dents is beyond the county's authority granted by statute.25 The court expressly
declined to decide the correctness of the court of appeal's holding.2 6
The North Carolina General Assembly has enacted a statutory scheme to
minimize city-county conflicts when cities expand their jurisdictions in response
to urban growth. The North Carolina Constitution vests legislative power in the
general assembly.27 Included in this power is the ability to provide for the or-
ganization and government of local governmental units. 28 The general assembly
may, however, delegate this power to the local governmental units of the state,
except where prohibited by the state constitution. 29 Pursuant to this authority,
the general assembly has delegated broad land use regulation powers to both
cities and counties. 30 These regulatory powers are essentially identical.3 1
To avoid potential power struggles between the two prominent units of lo-
cal government, the statutory delegation of zoning authority to cities and coun-
ties is explicit as to which zoning power applies to an area. The general
tion's public enterprises located within its borders and held that the statute related to pri-
vate property and was not to be broadened to include a municipality's use of land for a
public enterprise as listed in N.C.G.S. § 160A-311 .... [The court concluded] that the
City was not required to comply with the County's zoning ordinances in upgrading its
Westside Facility or in using it to provide sewer service to newly annexed areas.
Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 256, 362 S.E.2d at 556 ; see Davidson County, 85 N.C. App. at 37, 40,
42, 354 S.E.2d at 286-89.
24. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 256-57, 362 S.E.2d at 556; see supra text accompanying note
8.
25. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 260, 362 S.E.2d at 558.
26. Id. at 256, 362 S.E.2d at 556.
27. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 1.
28. Id. art. IV, § 1.
29. Id.; see Jackson v. Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment, 275 N.C. 155, 163, 166 S.E.2d 78,
83 (1969).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340 (1987) (county); id. § 160A-381 (city). There are at least two
reasons for delegating land use regulation to local governments. First, the substantial administrative
requirements associated with land use regulation dictate that this power be delegated. Second, being
closer to the effect of land use regulations, local governments are probably better qualified than state
or regional governments to respond to local land use problems. Comment, Urban Planning and
Land Use Regulation: The Need for Consistency, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 81, 84 (1978). "Cer-
tainly, the greater accessibility of local government should make it more responsive to citizen pres-
sure." Id. However, this sensitivity to local pressure may not best protect regional and statewide
concerns because "[tihe voice of the larger community to be served by land use controls [can be]
muted by the local clamor." Id.
31. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340 (1987) (county zoning power) with id. § 160A-381
(city zoning power).
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assembly has conferred on cities exclusive jurisdiction over areas within their
corporate limits. 32 Likewise, counties have the power to zone those areas of the
county not within a city.33 The zoning power of cities and counties extends to
the "erection, construction, and use of buildings by the State of North Carolina
and its political subdivisions."' 34 Therefore, city-owned buildings located outside
city limits are subject to the zoning laws of the county and vice versa. 35
The statutory framework delegating zoning powers to cities and counties
requires counties to defer to the growth of cities. It is a matter of state policy
"[t]hat sound urban development is essential to the continued economic develop-
ment of North Carolina."'36 To promote this development, the general assembly
has empowered cities to expand their corporate limits by a process of annexa-
tion.37 When a city annexes an area, the city obtains jurisdictional power over
that area to the exclusion of all other governmental subdivisions. 38 Even though
counties may control land use outside city limits, "[county zoning] regulations
shall be made with reasonable consideration to expansion and development of
any cities within the county, so as to provide for their orderly growth and devel-
opment."' 39 Not only are counties powerless to interfere with city annexation,
but they must facilitate it.
As a matter of public policy established by the general assembly, municipal-
ities exist "to provide the governmental services essential for sound urban devel-
opment and for the protection of health, safety and welfare in areas being
intensively used for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, and gov-
32. Id. § 160A-360(a); Taylor v. Bowen, 272 N.C. 726, 727, 158 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1968); Par-
sons v. Wright, 223 N.C. 520, 522, 27 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1943); County of Cumberland v. Eastern
Fed. Corp., 48 N.C. App. 518, 525, 269 S.E.2d 672, 677, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 527, 273 S.E.2d 453
(1980). To effect a smooth future annexation of a county area, a city may also exercise extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction over an area up to three miles beyond its city limits, depending on the population of
the city. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(a)-(e) (1987).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-122, -320; County of Cumberland v. Eastern Fed. Corp., 48 N.C.
App. 518, 525, 269 S.E.2d 672, 677 (1980).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-347 (1987) (county zoning power applicable to buildings of the
State and its political subdivisions located in county); id. § 160A-392 (city zoning power applicable
to buildings of state and its political subdivisions located in city); see Yancey v. North Carolina
Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 222 N.C. 106, 22 S.E.2d 256 (1942) (general statutes do not apply
to state unless expressly stated).
35. See supra note 23 discussing the distinction drawn by the court of appeals in Davidson
County between a building and a public enterprise as used in the North Carolina Statutes.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-45(l),-33(l) (1987).
37. See generally id. §§ 160A-29 to -58.9A (annexation by cities). City annexation may be
voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary annexation describes the process when an owner of land volun-
tarily petitions a city to annex his land. See id. § 160A-31. Involuntary annexation is initiated by
the city. See id. §§ 160A-46 (involuntary annexation by cities with population greater than 5,000),
160A-34 (involuntary annexation by cities with population less than 5,000). A city may annex land
that is contiguous or noncontiguous to city boundaries. Contiguous land may be annexed voluntarily
or involuntarily. See id. § 160A-31 (voluntary annexation); id. § 160A-36(b) (involuntary annexa-
tion by cities with population less than 5,000); id. § 160A-48(b) (involuntary annexation by cities
with population greater than 5,000). Noncontiguous land can be annexed only if the owner of land
requests annexation pursuant to §§ 58.1-58.6 of the North Carolina General Statutes, or if the non-
contiguous land is owned by the municipality pursuant to § 160A-58.7.
38. Id. § 160A-360(f); see Taylor v. Bowen, 272 N.C. 726, 727-28, 158 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1968).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-341 (1987).
[Vol. 661270
MUNICIPAL LAW
ernmental purposes or in areas undergoing such development." 4 Predictably, a
prerequisite to annexation is that a municipality stand ready to provide to a
newly annexed area each major municipal service provided to the municipality
at the time of annexation.41 "The central purpose behind [North Carolina's]
annexation procedure," as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court,
"is to assure that, in return for the added financial burden of municipal taxation,
the [newly annexed] residents receive the benefits of all the major services avail-
able to municipal residents." 42 Specifically, if the extension of sewer outfall lines
and sewer lines is necessary for the annexed area, plans for such extension must
be provided and construction must be completed within two years of the
annexation.4 3
As a corollary to the obligation to provide essential services to municipal
residents, a city has the authority to own and operate "public enterprises" to
furnish these services.44 A "public enterprise" refers to systems for sewer, elec-
tric power, water, gas, public transportation, solid waste, cable television, off-
street parking and airports4 5 Pursuant to statutory authority city-owned public
enterprises may be located outside corporate limits in counties.46 Allowing city-
owned public enterprises outside city limits seems necessary for several reasons:
1) often these systems will service both city and county residents, as is the case
for the Westside Facility; 2) good planning for future city growth will necessitate
locating public enterprises in the "path" of such growth, which might require
location outside city limits; 3) land located within city limits is more expensive;
and 4) often in a growing urban area there is no city land available for large
public enterprises. However, by allowing cities to own public enterprises outside
their corporate limits, the North Carolina statutory scheme has led to the kind
of city-county jurisdictional clash that arose in Davidson County.
Cabarrus County v. City of Charlotte47 illustrates this conflict. In Cabarrus
County the city of Charlotte owned a landfill, a public enterprise, located outside
city limits but within Cabarrus County.48 The issue presented was whether the
county had the power to impose its solid waste disposal ordinance on the city-
owned landfill, thereby overriding the fees set by Charlotte.4 9 The North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals noted that a city has the right to own a public enterprise
outside its city limits in a county.50 Because the statute empowering the county
40. Id. §§ 160A-45(2),-33(2).
41. Id. § 160A-31(e) (citizens of annexed area subject to debts, laws, ordinances, and regula-
tions of city as of date of annexation); id. § 160A-35(3) (city must set forth a plan for extension of
municipal services to annexed area before annexation); id. § 160A-47(3) (same); id. § 160A-58.3
(annexed area subject to city taxes); see Cockrell v. City of Raleigh, 306 N.C. 479, 487, 293 S.E.2d
770, 775 (1982).
42. In re Annexation Ordinance 300-X, 304 N.C. 549, 554, 284 S.E.2d 470, 474 (1981).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-47(3)(c) (1987).
44. Id. § 160A-312.
45. Id. § 160A-311.
46. Id. § 160A-312.
47. 71 N.C. App. 192, 321 S.E.2d 476 (1984).
48. Id. at 192-93, 321 S.E.2d at 477.
49. Id. at 194, 321 S.E.2d at 478.
50. Id. at 194, 321 S.E.2d at 478-79.
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to impose its solid waste disposal ordinance was not applicable to a city-owned
public enterprise located in the county, the court held that the county could not
override the city's landfill disposal fees.5 1
Cabarrus County illustrates the legislative bias toward granting cities the
power to control their public enterprises when located outside corporate limits
in a county. The North Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed this legislative bias
in deciding the jurisdictional conflict in Davidson County between a city's man-
date to service its residents and a county's statutory power to regulate land use
within its boundaries.52
In Davidson County the supreme court began its analysis by stating the
mode of statutory construction applicable to determining county powers.5 3 Be-
cause counties, like cities, exist solely as political subdivisions of North Carolina
and are created by statute, their powers are limited to: 1) those expressly
granted by statute, and 2) those necessarily or fairly implied from express pow-
ers.54 "The implied powers," the court has said, "are such as are necessarily or
reasonably implied from those expressly granted or such as are essential to the
exercise of those which are expressly conferred."55 Additionally, statutory pow-
ers are strictly construed.5 6
After establishing the method of statutory construction, the North Carolina
Supreme Court defined the scope of a county's statutory power to zone. Pursu-
ant to North Carolina General Statute section 150A-340, the court held that a
county's power to zone is limited to the purposes of promoting health, safety,
morals, or the general welfare by regulating and restricting buildings and other
structures.57 This zoning power applies'to buildings owned by the state of North
Carolina and its political subdivisions.58 In exercising its zoning power, a
51. Id.
52. 321 N.C. at 253, 362 S.E.2d at 554. In this case, the conflict arose because High Point's
sewer faeilty was located outside city limits but within Davidson County.
53. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 257, 362 S.E.2d at 557.
54. Id.; see O'Neal v. Wake County, 196 N.C. 184, 186, 145 S.E. 28, 29 (1928); Board of
Comm'rs v. Hanchett Bond Co., 194 N.C. 137, 138, 138 S.E. 614, 615 (1927); 1 DILLON, MUNICI-
PAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911); 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations § 194 (1971); see
also State v. Gulledge, 208 N.C. 204, 207, 179 S.E. 883, 885 (1935) (applying same standard to
cities); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-11 (1987) (county is political subdivision); id. § 160A-11 (city is
political subdivision).
55. O'Neal, 196 N.C. at 187, 145 S.E. at 29; see also Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 257, 362
S.E.2d at 557.
56. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 257, 362 S.E.2d at 557; see Jackson v. Guilford County Bd. of
Adjustment, 275 N.C. 155, 167, 166 S.E.2d 78, 86 (1969); Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v.
Guilford County, 225 N.C. 293, 301-02, 34 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1945); see also Porsh Builders, Inc. v.
City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 554, 276 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1981) (applying same standard to
cities); Kass v. Hedgepeth, 226 N.C. 405, 408, 38 S.E.2d 164, 165-66 (1968) (same).
57. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 257, 362 S.E.2d at 557.
[A] county may regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and
other structures, the percentage of lots that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and
other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, struc-
tures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes, and to provide density
credits or severable development rights for dedicated rights-of-way ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340 (1987).
58. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 257, 362 S.E.2d at 557; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-347
(1987).
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county may issue special use permits with "reasonable and appropriate condi-
tions and safeguards upon these permits." 59 Because Davidson County brought
suit to enforce the condition attached to the special use permit for expanding
and upgrading the city-owned Westside facility, the North Carolina Supreme
Court addressed the narrow issue of whether requiring county approval of the
extension of sewer services to city residents of newly annexed areas as a condi-
tion was reasonable and appropriate in light of the statutory language delegating
powers to counties and cities.6°
Strictly construing the statutory language of Section 153A-340 conferring
zoning powers on a county, the court determined that a county can "make ordi-
nances and regulate buildings within their borders." 6 1 However, nothing in the
statute empowers the county to regulate the provision of services from a public
enterprise to city residents in existing or newly annexed areas.62 Therefore, the
condition attached to the special use permit allowing Davidson County to regu-
late the city's provision of sewer services to city residents was beyond the
county's statutory authority.
The supreme court offered a sound policy argument for its conclusion: "To
hold otherwise would give the County unfettered discretion to control the City's
population growth through zoning restrictions and would ignore the legislative
intent with regard to'urban growth." 63 To promote the policy of urban growth,
cities have the power to annex land.64 Before a city can exercise its statutory,
annexation authority, however, it is obligated to provide municipal services, in-
cluding sewer service, to the annexed area.65 If counties could control the exten-
sion of municipal services to city-annexed areas, thereby preventing urban
growth, counties would have powers at odds with the statatory purpose of pro-
moting urban growth. Such power would lead to confusion and conflicts of ju-
risdiction and authority between cities and counties. 66 The supreme court
concluded: "Since the County has no authority to restrict or regulate the City's
provision of sewer service to its residents, the City can use the Westside Facility to
meet its statutory mandate without seeking the County's prior approval, even
59. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 257, 362 S.E.2d at 557; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-340
(1987). "A special [use] within the meaning of a zoning ordinance is [a use] which is expressly
permitted in a given zone upon proof that certain facts and conditions detailed in the ordinance
exist." In re Application of Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 425, 178 S.E.2d 77, 80 (1970). Certain land uses are
almost always subject to approval as special uses. An example is a community facility, such as a
sewage plant, that may have an adverse impact on an area but deserves consideration because it
serves a community need. D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 174 (1982). A special use differs from
a zoning variance which authorizes property use forbidden by a zoning ordinance. Id. at 166.
60. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 256-57, 362 S.E.2d at 556-57. Compare the issue addressed
by court of appeals supra note 23.
61. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 257, 362 S.E.2d at 557; see supra note 57.
62. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 258, 362 S.E.2d at 557; see Taylor v. Bowen, 272 N.C. 726,
727, 158 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1968).
63. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 258, 362 S.E.2d at 557; see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-45(l),
153A-341 (1987).
64. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-46 (1987).
65. Id. §§ 160A-47(3), -35(3).
66. Cf. Parsons v. Wright, 223 N.C. 520, 524, 27 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1943) (holding cities have
exclusive authority to regulate urban streets).
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though the facility is located in the county."' 67
In light of the statutory scheme conferring powers on counties and cities in
North Carolina, the result in Davidson County was entirely correct. Counties
should not be able to control city growth indirectly by regulating the provision
of municipal services to city residents when counties are prohibited by statute
from directly controlling city growth. A contrary ruling would upend the care-
ful subdivision of city and county powers established by North Carolina statutes.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court and the court of appeals
reached the same result in Davidson County, their respective rationales were
quite different. The supreme court should be commended for ruling on the nar-
row issue actually presented in Davidson County, rather than using the case, as
did the court of appeals, to decide an issue that was not properly presented by
the facts and that neither party in the suit briefed. 68 The supreme court cor-
rectly identified the issue presented in Davidson County as the validity of the
condition attached to the county's special use permit to upgrade the Westside
sewage facility, rather than the broad issue addressed by the court of appeals of
whether a city-owned public enterprise located outside city limits but within the
county is subject to county zoning regulations.
However, a significant aspect of Davidson County was that the supreme.
court intentionally did not decide the correctness of the court of appeals' ration-
ale, thus leaving open the issue in North Carolina of whether a city- owned pub-
lic enterprise located outside city limits but within a county is subject to county
zoning regulations.69 This is especially significant because the supreme court
admitted that the broad issue addressed by the court of appeals underlies the
conflict that arose in Davidson County, but it concluded that the resolution of
this issue was unnecessary in this case.70
The decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court to base its holding on
the narrower grounds can be seen as a commendable exercise of judicial re-
straint. Although the broader issue addressed by the court of appeals underlies
the conflict in Davidson County, the facts of the case and the issues presented did
not warrant a decision based on the broader issue. Such a decision would have
been premature and not based soundly on the facts. On the other hand, the
67. Davidson County, 321 N.C. at 259, 362 S.E.2d at 558 (emphasis added). The supreme court
also ruled against the county on the other two theories it had offered: 1) that the city was estopped
from challenging the condition of the special use permit, and 2) that the city's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies prohibited the city from challenging the condition. See id. at 259-60, 362
S.E.2d at 558. First, the city's acceptance of benefits of the county's special use permit did not estop
the city from challenging the condition attached to the special use permit because the city was not
questioning the validity of the permit, but only the interpretation of the condition. Id. at 259, 362
S.E.2d at 558. Second, the city's failure to exhaust the administrative remedies to challenge the
special use permit did not preclude the city from challenging the meaning of the condition. Id. at
260, 362 S.E.2d at 558. Because the interpretation of the condition was at issue, the city had no
reason to appeal the issuance of the permit within the required thirty-day period after receiving the
permit. Id. at 260, 362 S.E.2d at 558.
68. Id. at 256, 362 S.E.2d at 556.
69. Id. "We express no opinion as to the correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that a
city-owned public enterpise located outside corporate limits is not subject to the county's zoning
laws." Id.
70. Id.; see supra note 23.
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court of appeals pointed out a problem lurking behind the scene in city-county
relations. The issue has not been addressed in North Carolina, and other juris-
dictions have reached varying results in determining whether city-owned public
enterprises located outside city limits are exempt from complying with county
zoning regulations. 71
JAMEs G. FARRIS, JR.
71. See Davidson County, 85 N.C. App. 28, 31-32, 354 S.E.2d 280, 283-84 (1987) (discussing
the split in jurisdictions).
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